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Insurance
by Maximilian A. Pock*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Georgia Supreme Court and Georgia Court of Appeals have
handed down over eighty insurance cases during this past survey year.1
A surprising number of these are cases of first impression. The
Uninsured Motorist Act 2 spawned about thirteen percent of the total
volume of decided cases, a fact which is not surprising if one keeps in
mind that the general litigation proneness of uninsured and underinsured legislation is a well-documented national phenomenon.3 It is
estimated that one of five drivers in this country is uninsured. This can
hardly be the case in Georgia. Yet, one must remember that even under
Georgia's compulsory liability regime, insureds often discover that their
policies provide no coverage for specific cars or specific occurrences.4
The Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act,5 Georgia's
ersatz version of no-fault legislation, cast a long shadow into the present,
and managed to generate about nine percent of the total volume of

* Professor of Law, National Law Center, The George Washington University.
University of Iowa (J.D., 1958); University of Michigan (S.J.D., 1962). Associate Professor

of Law, Emory University (1961-65). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. This Survey encompasses cases officially reported and made available in print
between June 1, 1994 and May 31, 1995. It is difficult to speak of any discernible
numerical trends. The number of appellate insurance cases increased from an average of
60 in the 1960s to an average of 90 in the 1980s and early 1990s. However, there were
significant fluctuations from year to year with numbers reaching as many as 125.
2.

O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (1992 & Supp. 1994).

3. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALLAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 4.9(a) (1988)
[hereinafter KEETON & WIDISS].
4. See, e.g., Noakes v. Atlanta Casualty Cos., 215 Ga. App. 398, 450 S.E.2d 861 (1994)
(holding that a newly acquired car was not covered because of late notification of the
insurer).
5.

O.C.G.A. § 33-34-1 (1990 & Supp. 1995).
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decided cases. When one considers that the Act received a decent burial
in 1991, this is a bit surprising.6

Eighteen of the eighty bills and resolutions introduced in the 143rd
Georgia General Assembly became law. Since all are quite detailed and
some are omnibus bills amending a host of different statutory provisions,
a space-limited survey of this kind cannot begin to do them justice.
Collectively, they bear testimony to the nonretrograde and orderly
evolution of Georgia law as it relates to policy contents, intermediaries,
and insurance institutions in general. Two examples will bear out this
assertion. The first is the creation of the insurer-financed Special
Insurance Fraud Fund "for the purpose of funding the investigation and
prosecution of insurance fraud."' The second is the mandate that
accident and sickness insurance carriers make available optional
"coverage for bone marrow transplants for the treatment of breast cancer
and Hodgkins disease."' With this simple stroke of the pen, the
legislature put an end, at least in Georgia, to a highly contentious
controversy that continues to plague many sister states. One last
general observation is perhaps in order: User-friendly "easy reading"
automobile policies and homeowner's policies now definitely dominate
appellate litigation. They are in the process of accumulating salubrious
judicial gloss which refines their meaning without interpolation or
evisceration and thus make them much more useful in the legal market
place than the recondite and gnarled policies of yore.
To provide continuity and enhance readability, the cases selected for
expatiation will, as far as possible, be organized and discussed under the
chapter headings and rubrics employed during the past three decades.
II. ASSIGNMENTS
An assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor. Absent estoppel,
waiver, or third party beneficiary clauses,9 the obligor may assert
against the assignee all those defenses arising out of the underlying
contract which it could have asserted against the assignor.
In Owens v. Allstate Insurance Co.,' ° the victim of an automobile
accident obtained a default judgment against the "guilty" party who had

6. DawkinsiTaylor Bill, 1991 Ga. Laws 1608 (repealing O.C.GA. § 33-34-2 to -17 and
replacing it with a new Chapter 34).
7. 1995 Ga. Laws 1242 (adding new subsection O.C.G-.A § 33-1-17 (1992 & Supp.
1995)).
8. 1995 Ga. Laws 302 (adding new subsection O.C.G.A. § 33-29-3.3 (1990)).

9. Standard or Union Mortgage Clause specifically states that the insured's "acts and
neglect" cannot be asserted as defenses against the loss-payee/assignee.
10.

216 Ga. App. 650, 455 S.E.2d 368 (1995).
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totally ignored the lawsuit. Subsequently, the judgment debtor assigned
to the victim any contractual claims he had against his liability insurer
"for the amount of the judgment."" When the insurer denied liability,
the victim brought an action against it for the amount of the default
judgment as well as bad faith penalties and attorney fees. The court
held that the judgment debtor's abject failure to cooperate with his
insurer by forwarding suit papers and assisting in the investigation of
the occurrence served as a defense against the insured assignor and
hence could be asserted against his assignee.'" The court also held that
even in the absence of any such defense, the victim had no standing to
collect statutory bad faith damages or attorney fees because the duty to
pay such damages runs only to an insured who is a party to the contract
and not to the victim, who is but a contingent third party beneficiary."3
Furthermore, an assignment "of the judgment" or "for the amount of the
judgment" does not furnish standing
to recover statutory damages in
14
excess of the amount assigned.
It should be noted that the court did not directly hold that the right
to recover statutory damages was so personal as to thwart any attempts
to assign it. 5
What are the jural relationships created by a post-occurrence
assignment of claims under a health insurance policy to a health care
provider? In North American Life & Casualty Co. v. Riedl,5 the court
of appeals held that such transfer was but a partial assignment of
prospective proceeds which created a joint interest and not a full
assignment of the policy itself. 7 As such, it created joint rights
qualifying both the assignor and the assignee as real parties in
interest."8 The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed. 9 An assignment
of proceeds effected by appropriate language of present transfer is
nevertheless a valid assignment, even though it leaves the assignor's
rights in the underlying contract intact.20 As such it divests the

11. Id. at 651, 455 S.E.2d at 369.
12. Id. at 652, 455 S.E.2d at 370.
13. Id. at 651, 455 S.E.2d at 369 (paraphrasing and explaining O.C.G.A, § 33-4-6
(1990)).
14. Id.
15. By stressing the distinction between assignees and policyholders the court, one
might contend, at least obliquely hints at the possible nonassignability of such personal
claims. Id.
16. 209 Ga. App. 883, 434 S.E.2d 820 (1993).
17. Id. at 884, 434 S.E.2d at 821-22.
18. Id. at 885, 434 S.E.2d at 822.
19. Allianz Life Ins. Co. v. Riedl, 264 Ga. 395, 444 S.E.2d 736 (1994).
20. Id. at 397, 444 S.E.2d at 737.
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assignor of the specific claim assigned and leaves the assignee as the
only real party in interest entitled to assert the transferred claim.21
However, an action brought by the assignor should not be dismissed
until the assignee has been given "a reasonable opportunity to ratify or
join the action

or to be substituted for [the assignor]."22

The supreme court distinguished this situation from cases involving
a mere direction or authorization to the insurer-obligor to make direct
payments to a third party, which does not rise to the dignity of an
assignment.
It also suggested in dicta that an assignor may still
assert the assigned claim in his own name "if the assignee consented to
the assignor bringing suit or ...reassigned the benefits to the assignor
or ...refused or neglected to bring such an action."24

III. CANCELLATION, NONRENEWAL, AND LAPSE OF INSURANCE
Does a fire insurance carrier have to notify the insured and the
designated lienholder loss-payee of the lapse of the policy and its
nonrenewal for nonpayment of the renewal premium? In Southern
General Insurance Co. v. Tippins Bank & Trust Co.,2 the court held
that it does not.26 The 1984 amendment of section 33-24-46 of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") on "cancellation or
nonrenewal of certain property insurance policies" which struck the
section in its entirety,27 defined "nonrenewal" as "a refusal by the
insurer ...

to renew"" and provided that "[n]o insurer shall refuse to

renew a policy... unless a written notice of nonrenewal is mailed or
delivered in person to the named insured."2 9 Gone was the former
language defining "nonrenewal" as the "failureor refusal by an insurer

21. The court overruled "several, sometimes conflicting rulings on this issue" to the
extent that they were inconsistent with its opinion. Id. at 398, 444 S.E.2d at 738, 739. By
misreading a double negative on the last page of the first opinion in Riedl, this writer
erroneously concluded that the holding of the court of appeals was much more in line with
the final holding of the supreme court than it actually was. Maximilian A. Pock, Insurance,
46 MERCER L. REV. 261, 264 (1994). Apologies are hereby tendered.
22. 264 Ga. at 398, 444 S.E.2d at 739 (quoting and relying upon O.C.G.A. § 9-11-17(a)
(1990)).
23. Such authorizations generally create mere powers of attorney. Id. at 396, 444
S.E.2d at 737.
24. Id. at 398, 444 S.E.2d at 738.
25. 213 Ga. App. 176, 444 S.E.2d 331 (1994).
26. Id. at 178, 444 S.E.2d at 333.
27. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-46 (1990).
28. 213 Ga. App. at 178, 444 S.E.2d at 332 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 33-24-46(bX1) (1990)).
29. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 33-24-46(d)) (emphasis supplied by court).
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to renew" 3° and the former requirement for informing lienholders of
"cancellation and nonrenewal" of policies.31 In view of the legislative
history and the clear language of the 1984 amendment which focuses not
on the "failure" (the fact of nonrenewal upon lapse of a policy) but on the
insurer's affirmative "refusal" to renew (an expression of unwillingness
to renew),32 the court concluded that "it is clear to us that the legislature intended to remove from the insurer the duty to send notice to
either the insured or any lienholders that a policy was about to terminate
unless it was an unwillingness or refusal on the insurer's part that
resulted in termination or cancellation."3 3
The effect of this decision seems hardly cataclysmic. It does not affect
cancellations during the policy term34 or "affirmative" nonrenewals by
the insurer.3 " Furthermore, most policies are kept in escrow by
lienholders which routinely monitor their status. The situation may be
further alleviated by contract. Thus, the New York Standard Fire
Policy, the grandfather of all fire policies, which has entered most states'
regulatory scheme, provides that lienholders be given ten days written
notice of cancellation.3 6 Similarly, the new standard "easy-reading"
homeowner's policy provides that "if we decide to cancel or not renew
this policy the mortgagee will be notified at least [ten] days before the
date cancellation or renewal takes effect."37 The popular standard or
union mortgage clause which gives the lienholder bullet-proof protection
by providing that the mortgagee's insurance "shall not be invalidated by
any act or neglect of the mortgagor" 8 may also ease the situation. Yet,
it should be noted that the language imposing a contractual requirement
for notification in policies and standard mortgage clauses may pose some
of the same issues as those raised in Tippins. Does it apply to automatic
termination and nonrenewal upon lapse of the policy?

30. Id. at 177, 444 S.E.2d at 332 (citing former GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2430.3 (Harrison
1977), the predecessor of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-47, repealed by 1984 Ga. Laws 1358).
31. Id. at 179,444 S.E.2d at 333 (quoting former O.C.G.A. § 33-24-47, repealed by 1984
Ga. Laws 1358).
32. Id. at 178, 444 S.E.2d at 333 (relying on WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 991 (1987) for a definition of refuse).
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44(d) (1990).
35. 213 Ga. App. at 177, 440 S.E.2d at 332.
36. ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW, 596 app. A (1971) [hereinafter KEETON].
37. ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, 1991 POLICY KIT FOR STUDENTS OF INSURANCE

28 Section I-Conditions § 12 (1991) (1984 Homeowners Policy) [hereinafter KIT].
38. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 3, at §§ 4.1(bX3), 4.2(b), 4.2(e). This includes
nonpayment of premiums, ROBERT H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 53(AXa)
(1987) [hereinafter JERRY].

158

MERCER LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 47

What is necessary for effective notification? In ContinentalInsurance
Co. v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.," the court reaffirmed that a
notice of cancellation need not be received.' Evidence that the notice
was mailed to the insured's last address of record and obtaining as a
receipt a stamped "PORS" list from postal authorities is all that is
required.4"
In Moore v. Scottsdale Insurance Co.,42 the supreme court had an
occasion to establish the minimum requirements for such receipt from
postal authorities. The O.C.G.A. sets up two requirements for effective
notification.43 First, that the notice "shall be mailed to the last address
of record and shall be dispatched by at least first-class mail."" Second,
that the sender obtain a "receipt provided by the United States Postal
Service or such other evidence of mailing as prescribed or accepted by
the United States Postal Service."45 There was evidence that the
insurer had in fact mailed the notice to the last address of record.
However, the receipt from the post office was but a rubber-stamped
"computer-generated list of policy-holders to whom mailings were being
sent" which identified the addressee by name and policy number but did
not include his address.4" The supreme court held that the receipt was
inadequate.4 7 The statute demanded a receipt certifying that the notice
was sent to the addressee and was not satisfied by a receipt which just
happened to comport with the internal regulations of the postal
service.4"
IV.

CONSTRUCTION AND DEFINITIONS

Construction of writings, although presenting a mixed question of law
and fact, is for historical reasons a bench decision. Thus, the court held
49
in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Brannon
that a judge's instruction to the
jury "that an exclusionary provision in an insurance contract is to be
construed strictly against the insurer, but it is equally true that the

39. 212 Ga. App. 839, 443 S.E.2d 509 (1994).
40. Id. at 843, 443 S.E.2d at 512.
41. Id. at 842, 443 S.E.2d at 511-12 (citing O.C.GA. § 33-24-44(b) (1990)).
42. 264 Ga. 808, 450 S.E.2d 198 (1994).
43. Id. at 810, 450 S.E.2d at 199 (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-22-13(c) (1992)).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 809, 450 S.E.2d at 199 (quoting O.C.GA. § 33-22-13(c) (1992)) (emphasis
added).

46. Id. at 808, 450 S.E.2d at 198.
47. Id. at 810, 450 S.E.2d at 199.

48. Id.
49. 214 Ga. App. 300, 447 S.E.2d 666 (1994).
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construction must be a reasonable construction" 0 was reversible error.
It would be otherwise "where the meaning of obscurely written words is
involved, and where there is evidence that the meaning of such words
was differently understood in one way or another by the parties to the
contract." 51
A.

Complications of Pregnancy
Lemieux v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc.52 involved a
single-person health plan intended to provide only limited benefits in
connection with pregnancies. Although providing coverage for "complications of pregnancy... from conditions requiring hospital confinement
when the pregnancy is not terminated and whose diagnoses are distinct
from pregnancy but are adversely affected by pregnancy or are caused
by pregnancy," it explicitly withheld coverage for "benefits for a normal
or difficult delivery." 3 Did the plan cover a cesarean delivery section?
The court held that it definitely did not. The term "terminate" in
common parlance means "the ending of pregnancy by abortion or
miscarriage."" Since all pregnancies end "in some fashion"55 it was
absurd for the insurer to urge upon the court a construction of "terminate" which would make pregnancy complication benefits available only
"where the pregnancy never 'terminates."'5 6 In principle, coverage for
complications was thus still available even though the pregnancy
"terminated" when the child was delivered. 7 It was not, however,
available in this case. The cesarean section here was not the result of
"complications ...from conditions ...whose diagnoses are distinct from

pregnancy." It was rather the result of the pregnancy itself and thus
outside of the compass of coverage.5"
B.

Loss Caused by Theft
When a car is stolen and not recovered, the loss to the insured owner
is the cash value of the car5 9 at the time of its abstraction regardless
50. Id. at 300, 447 S.E.2d at 668 (quoting the instructions).
51. Id. at 301,447 S.E.2d at 668 (quoting California Ins. Co. v. Blumberg, 101 Ga. App.
587, 591-92, 115 S.E.2d 266, 269 (1960)).
52. 216 Ga. App. 230, 453 S.E.2d 749 (1994).
53. Id. at 230, 453 S.E.2d at 750 (quoting the policy, with emphasis supplied by court).
54. Id. at 231, 453 S.E.2d at 751.
55. Id.

56.
57.
58.
59.
group,

Id.
Id.
Id. at 232, 453 S.E.2d at 751, 752.
A number of automobile insurance companies, including the Kemper Insurance
have pioneered "replacement value" policies which, of course, do not provide

160
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of its sentimental value. What is the insured's loss when the car is
recovered in damaged condition?
In Brown v. Southeastern Security Insurance Co.,6° the insured
claimed the theft had caused substantial damage to the car's engine.
She did not assert her claim until several months after the car's recovery
and after it had been driven over 10,000 miles. The policy at issue
merely declared that "[l]oss(es) caused by ...theft ... are comprehensive losses."61 The court held that this theoretically obligated the
insurer to compensate the insured for all damage originating between
the date of the car's abstraction and the date of its recovery according to
the generally accepted principles of causation, 2 Practically, however,
the insured was out of luck because in the premises she had failed to
show by specific evidence that there was the requisite causal nexus
between the theft and the proven damage to the engine."
This suggests that insureds should have their stolen and recovered
cars thoroughly inspected and subjected to diagnostic tests in order to
perfect their claims against their insurers for "hidden" damage.
C.

ProfessionalServices
Misconduct which transcends the periphery of well or poorly rendered
professional services is, like pornography, easy to recognize but hard to
define. In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Alderman,64 a case
of first impression, the court appears to bear out this observation.
Reduced to their essentials, the allegations reveal the following scenario:
A patient sought out a physician with a complaint about a superficial
"marble-sized cyst, which was under the skin between her vagina and
right leg."" Despite having been told that the cyst was superficial, the
physician "inserted his finger into (her) vagina and began rubbing upand down as if he were trying to excite (her)."6 Although told that the
cyst was not in the vagina, he "began massaging her clitoris" and acting
"as if he was having a sexual experience.., until she.., pulled away
from him.""
The insurer sought a judicial declaration that it did not have to defend
the patient's tort action under the malpractice policy it had issued to the
replacement value for stolen automobiles in order to discourage arranged thefts.
60. 216 Ga. App. 234, 454 S.E.2d 158 (1995).
61. Id. at 234, 454 S.E.2d at 158 (quoting the policy) (emphasis added).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 235, 454 S.E.2d at 159.
64. 216 Ga. App. 777, 455 S.E.2d 852 (1995).
65. Id. at 777, 455 S.E.2d at 852.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 777-78, 455 SE.2d at 853.
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physician. The policy furnished "protection against 'professional liability
claims' which might be brought against him in his practice as a
physician or surgeon" and "covered him for damages resulting from his
providing or withholding of 'professional services."'6 8
Obviously, malpractice policies cover the tortious rendition of
professional services. If it were otherwise, there would be no need for
them at all. It was therefore necessary to determine whether the
allegations spoke to the tortious rendition of professional services or to
matters outside the compass of such services;
In the absence of hard Georgia authority, 9 the court relied heavily
on a palette of polyphyletic foreign decisions for parameters and factors
in order to piece together a meaningful and serviceable definition of
"professional services.""0
Its conclusions may be paraphrased as
follows: "Professional services" derive their character from the "nature
of the act" performed and not from the situational status (or professional
title) of the actor; they do not encompass all acts "flowing from mere
employment," but only those which involve the "use or application of
special learning or attainments;" they include only tortious acts that are
inextricably intertwined with their very rendition.7 1
Viewed in light of these confining factors, the sexual assault or battery
alleged was physically outside the perimeter of the professional services
demanded by an examination of the patient's cyst and served "solely for
the satisfaction of [the actor's] prurient interests."7 2 Accordingly, the
insurer was under no obligation to furnish a defense.7"
D.

Total Disability

Although generalizations are risky, it is probably fair to say that
disability policies come in two varieties: those which define disability as
incapacity to follow a "particular" occupation and those which define it

68. Id. at 778, 455 S.E.2d at 853 (quoting and paraphrasing the policy).
69. The court found that St. Paul Fire Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 164 Ga. App. 215, 296
S.E.2d 126 (1982) was inapplicable because it dealt with a psychiatrist's improper but
nevertheless "therapy related" transference and counter-transference techniques. Id. at
779, 455 S.E.2d at 854. This issue has generated a prodigious amount of litigation with
conflicting outcomes. See, e.g., Hartogs v. Employees Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 391 N.Y.S.2d 962
(1977).
70. 216 Ga. App. at 779, 455 S.E.2d at 853-54.
71. Id. (because of the profusion of foreign case authority relied upon, individual
citations are omitted).
72. Id., 455 S.E.2d at 854.
73. Presiding Judge McMurray's dissent held out for a more liberal test focusing on
whether the tortious conduct occurred during or in the course of the medical examination
at issue. Id. at 780, 455 S.E.2d at 854 (McMurray, J., dissenting).
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as incapacity to follow "any" occupation. The latter and more common

variety has certain in terrorem qualities about it. An innocent reader
may well be forgiven for believing that she would literally have to
qualify as a quadriplegic in order to collect benefits.74 Fortunately,
reality is not as stark as all that. Long before the advent of Naderite
consumerism, Georgia has followed a moderate line in interpreting
disability policies which seems to produce results that are fair to all
parties in carrying out their implicit intent.75
This is again evidenced by Equicor, Inc. v. Stamey 76 involving a
policy of the "any" occupation variety. An Atlanta motorcycle police
officer and nineteen-year veteran of the force retired because of
permanent disability after he had severely injured his knee.7 7 The
group life and accident policy in question required the insurer to make
sixty monthly payments in fixed amounts in case the officer became
"totally disabled by injury or disease" and thus "not able, presumably for
life, to do any work for compensation or gain."7 1 Undisputed medical
testimony showed that the officer was incapable of performing "any
activities relating to police work."79 There was also evidence that the
officer had a good deal of formal education. He held a law degree,
although he had not passed the bar and was no longer qualified to take
it; he also held an accounting degree and a graduate degree in government administration. Yet he had no practical work experience in any of
these areas." The insurer's vocational rehabilitation expert painted an
optimistic picture of his prospects for holding sedentary but lucrative
jobs in "middle management positions"8 ' and "supervisory or teaching
jobs in security." 2 The court perceived these options as chimerical.
The officer had absolutely no experience in these fields and his modest
career in the police department-he had failed the examination for sergeant-suggested that "he has problems translating his education into
viable work experience."' The trial court's finding, in a bench trial,
that the officer was totally disabled, therefore, accorded with settled
74. See EDWIN W. PATTERSON, ESSENIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 240-242 (2d ed. 1957)
[hereinafter PATTERSON]; JERRY, supra note 38, § 64(a); WILLIAM R. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 205 (3d ed. 1951).
75. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. South, 179 Ga. 653, 177 S.E. 499 (1934) (a railroad
switchman requiring amputation of an arm may be considered totally disabled).
76.

216 Ga. App. 375, 454 S.E.2d 550 (1995).

77. Id. at 376, 454 S.E.2d at 551-52.
78. Id. (quoting the policy, with emphasis added).
79. Id. at 378, 454 S.E.2d at 553 (quoting testimony).

80. Id. at 376, 454 S.E.2d at 552.
81. Id. at 378, 454 S.E.2d at 553 (quoting testimony).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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Georgia law which requires only that the insured be unable to perform
substantial portions of his ordinary employment or any other employment approximating the same livelihood as he might fairly be expected
In view of the settled
to follow, given his personal circumstances.'
refusal
to pay the claim
nature of Georgia law in this area, the insurer's
the trial court's
warranted
and
thus
could be seen as stubbornly litigious
award of attorney fees and litigation expenses.' Furthermore, the trial
court was justified in awarding nonpenal prejudgment interest because
payments were liquidated and their dates of accrual were
the disability
86
fixed.

Vacant Land
In Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Smelcer,87 a homeowner's
policy included within the purview of insured locations "vacant land,
other than farm land, owned by or rented to an insured."' s It contained
no definition of the term "vacant." The insured homeowner owned a
separate tract of land located at some distance from the home he
occupied "on which was located his maternal family's abandoned old
house and abandoned old country store."8 9 Vandals set fire to the old
house and a fire fighter was killed while trying to put out the fire. Did
the policy cover his death? The court held that it did not. The term
vacant modified the term land. It was not ambiguous and thus
precluded application of contraproferentem. In the understanding of the
average policyholder, the term vacant denotes "empty or deprived of
contents or without inanimate objects"' and not merely untenanted or
unoccupied by human beings. Such restrictive meaning is also
consonant with the purpose of the policy which involves classification of
risks. Obviously, empty land in its natural state poses a different loss
risk than improved or built-up land, a reality to which "[tihis case bears
tragic witness."91 The court observed that its conclusion would have
been different had the policy referred to vacant structures rather than
E.

84. Id. at 377,454 S.E.2d at 552 (relying upon the test enunciated by Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Barron, 198 Ga. 1, 9, 30 S.E.2d 879, 884 (1994)).
85. Id. at 378, 454 S.E.2d at 553 (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (1982 & Supp. 1994)).
86. Id. at 379, 454 S.E.2d at 553 (citing O.C.GA. § 7-4-15 (1989)).
87. 212 Ga. App. 376, 441 S.E.2d 788 (1994).
88. Id. at 376, 441 S.E.2d at 788 (quoting the policy).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 377, 441 S.E.2d at 789 (citing and relying on the encyclopedic California
decision in Bianchi v. Westfield Ins. Co., 191 Cal. App. 3d 287, 236 Cal. Rptr. 343 (4th Dist.
1987)).
91. Id.
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vacant land. In that case the old house would have been covered so long
as it was empty of contents.92
V. EXCEPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS
Exceptions and exclusions detract from and reduce the protection
afforded by the general coverage clause. They are strictly construed
against the insurer. Practically they affect the burden of proof.
Insureds have the burden of proving that an occurrence fits the language
of the coverage clause. Insurers have the burden of proving that it fits
one of the exceptions or exclusions.9"
A.

Automobile Policies
In General Car & Truck Leasing System v. Woodruff," a rental
agreement which potentially provided for primary insurance 5 excluded
such coverage "while the vehicle is used, operated or driven in violation
of any of the [agreement's] provisions.'o One such provision prohibited
"the renter from operating the vehicle '[in violation of any law,
ordinance, rule or regulation of any governmental agency or body.'" '97
The lessor/insurer contended, inter alia, that the renter had forfeited
such coverage as he might have had because he had been cited and paid
a fine for the "crime" of following another vehicle too closely.9 The
court held that such "blanket" blunderbuss exclusion was violative of
public policy even though the renter had other insurance coverage
available.9' The court held that an exclusion encompassing all manner
of traffic violations was untenable because "we can think of no reason
why one would need liability insurance unless there is a possibility of
liability such as ... running a red light or following too closely."l"c
Whether an exclusion from liability in an automobile insurance
contract runs afoul of Georgia public policy is an issue which compels a

92. Id.
93. Construction of written contracts is a bench and not a jury decision. When a
policy is nonambiguous it is error to instruct the jury on the maxims of contract

construction. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Brannon, 214 Ga. App. 300, 447 S.E.2d 666 (1994).
94.

214 Ga. App. 200, 447 S.E.2d 97 (1994).

95. Id. at 201-02, 447 S.E.2d at 99.
96. Id. at 203, 447 S.E.2d at 100 (quoting the agreement with emphasis added).
97. Id. (quoting the agreement, with emphasis added).
98. Such conduct is in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-49(a) (1994).
99. 214 Ga. App. at 203, 447 S.E.2d at 100 (court distinguished Auto-Owners Ins. Co.
v. Jackson, 211 Ga. App. 613, 440 S.E.2d 242 (1994) which did not involve a "blanket"
exclusion but a sharply focused exclusion for "intentional acts.").
100. Id. at 204, 447 S.E.2d at 100 (relying on dicta in Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Neese, 254 Ga. 335, 338, 329 S.E.2d 136, 139 (1985)).
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discrete case-by-case evaluation.1"' Federated Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Dunton"° serves as a paradigmatic case on this point. The employee of a corporation was involved in a collision while driving one of the
corporation's trucks. Before getting into the cab, he asked his employer
whether the truck was covered by insurance and was given an affirmative answer and shown an insurance card. When the injured driver of
the other vehicle brought an action against the employee and his
employer, they discovered the employer was bankrupt and the truck was
not covered by insurance. To add insult to injury, the employee was also
refused coverage by his own personal automobile liability carrier because
of a specific exclusion in his policy."0 3 The exclusion, which is part of
the "new" 1985 standard personal auto policy,' in pertinent part,
states that "[we do not provide ... Coverage for any person: ...

Maintaining or using any vehicle while that person is employed or
otherwise engaged in any 'business' (other than farming or ranching)."0 5 Facially, the court conceded, this precluded coverage because
the employee drove the employer's truck (a non-owned truck from the
vantage point of the employee) in the employer's business.", This,
however, was not the end of the story. Georgia's mandatory insurance
regime "has the dual purpose of protecting both 'the innocent victim of
the negligent members of the motoring public ...[and] the insured from
unfair exposure to unanticipated liability.'"'0 7 In the present case
"both ... interests implicated are unprotected.""~

Enforcing the

exclusion literally means that the victim cannot collect from the
employee's own insurer or from the now bankrupt employer. It also
means that the employee who had done his best to make certain that he
was not getting into an uninsured vehicle is now personally exposed to
liability. 9 It follows that the exclusion is violative of Georgia policy

101. Southern Guar. Ins. Co. v. Federated Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 257 Ga. 355, 356, 359
S.E.2d 665, 667 (1987).
102. 213 Ga. App. 148, 444 S.E.2d 123 (1994).
103. Id. at 148, 444 S.E.2d at 124.
104. See KIT, supra note 37, at 3 Part A (Exclusions).
105. 213 Ga. App. at 150, 444 S.E.2d at 125 (quoting the policy in part with emphasis
added).
106. Id. at 151, 444 S.E.2d at 126.
107. Id. at 149,444 S.E.2d at 124 (quoting Stepho v. Allstate Ins. Co., 259 Ga. 475,476,
383 S.E.2d 887-88 (1989)).
108. Id.
109. Id., 444 S.E.2d at 124.
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to the extent that it allows the insurer to escape responsibility for the
minimum amount of liability coverage compelled by law 1 °
B. Business and Comprehensive CatastrophicLiability Policies
In Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Plantation Pipeline Co.,"'
a case of first impression, the insured bulk petroleum transmission
company discovered a leak in one of its underground pipelines in the
Piedmont region of South Carolina. The leak required expensive
recovery and clean-up work extending over a number of years. The court
had to decide whether the calamity was covered despite a primary
exclusion which, in pertinent part, stated that the policy did not cover
property damage "arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or
escape of ...

contaminants or pollutants ...

into ...

any watercourse

or body of water" and provided that "this exclusion ... does not apply if
12 It also had
such discharge . . . is sudden and accidental."'
to decide

whether there was coverage despite a supplementary exclusion which
stated, in pertinent part, that the policy did not cover damage for
"discharge... of oil or other petroleum substance or derivative.., into
...
any watercourse or body of water"regardless of whether it is "sudden
and accidental.""'
The court held that there was coverage under the "exclusion from the
primary exclusion" because the discharge was "sudden and accidental.""4 The phrase did not denote abrupt or instantaneous but merely
"unexpected and unintended.""' There was also coverage despite the
supplementary exclusion because the groundwater, which was admittedly contaminated, did not constitute a "watercourse or body of water"
within the intendment of the policy as applied to the particular location
affected."' Expert testimony explained that groundwater systems are
characterized as extensive quantities "of water sufficient to supply water
to wells and springs" with horizontal bedded aquifers (water-bearing
rock formations) and "confining beds."" 7 In the Piedmont region, the

110. The court distinguished Kilgore v. Southern Gen. Ins. Co., 210 Ga. App. 434, 436
S.E.2d 547 (1993), holding that where the insured has actual or constructive notice at the
very inception of the fateful trip that there was no coverage. 213 Ga. App. at 150, 444
S.E.2d at 125.
111. 214 Ga. App. 23, 447 S.E.2d 89 (1994).
112. Id. at 26, 447 S.E.2d at 91 (quoting the policy, with emphasis added).
113. Id., 447 S.E.2d at 91-92 (quoting the policy, with emphasis added).
114. Id., 447 S.E.2d at 91.
115. Id. (citing Claussens v. Aetna Casualty Ins. Co., 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686
(1989)).
116. Id. at 28, 447 S.E.2d at 93.
117. Id. (summarizing and quoting the expert's testimony in part).
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location of the calamity, the groundwater consisted only of "water held
in the small openings between sand grains and clay particles in the soil
...or the small fractures in the underlying bedrock."' 18 The court
held that in the premises "groundwater" did not equate with "body of
water" and dismissed as inapplicable some contrary decisions in western
states which dealt with different geological realities."
By way of contrast, in American States Insurance Co. v. Zippro
Construction Co.,120 the court decided that the absolute pollution
exclusion in a commercial liability policy covering a construction
contractor barred coverage for asbestos damage caused in the course of
repairing a termite-infested kitchen floor.121 The policy excluded
coverage for damage "arising out of the actual, alleged, or threatened
discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, or release of pollutants" and
defined "pollutants" as "any solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or
contaminant."'22 The court's apodictic and pithy response to the
insured was that "[tihere is little question that asbestos
constitutes a
" 123
pollutant as unambiguously defined in the exclusion.
C.

Homeowner's Liability Floater
Georgia courts treat general "violation of law" exclusions with some
suspicion-but there are exceptions. Horace Mann Insurance Co. v.
Drury124 involved a scenario which, but for the nonhumorous finale,
reminds one of a Keystone Kops sequence. A passenger in the front seat
of a car lit a "jumping jack" firecracker and threw it out the window.
The firecracker immediately reentered the car through the rear window
where it set fire to 2000 jumping jacks and caused an explosion. As a
result the passenger in the rear seat was injured. 25 Did the culprit's
liability floater in his homeowner's policy provide coverage despite an
exclusion of liability-creating conduct "which constitutes a violation of

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. (summarizing and quoting the expert's testimony in part).
Id. (citation omitted).
216 Ga. App. 499, 455 S.E.2d 133 (1995).
Id. at 499, 455 S.E.2d at 134.
Id. at 500, 455 S.E.2d at 135 (quoting the policy).

123. Id. at 501, 455 S.E.2d at 135. See Bold Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 216
Ga. App. 382, 454 S.E.2d 582 (1995) (giving literal effect to the "errors in processing"

exclusion found in a manufacturer's all-risk policy); see also Kirby v. Northwestern Natl
Casualty Co., 213 Ga. App. 673, 445 S.E.2d 791 (1994) (upholding a liquor liability"
exclusion in a comprehensive general liability (CGL) policy issued to an adult entertainment establishment).

124. 213 Ga. App. 321, 445 S.E.2d 272 (1994).
125. Id. at 321, 445 S.E.2d at 273.
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any criminal law or statute."2 ' Exploding, possessing, or transporting
fireworks is unlawful 2 7 and is expressly declared to be a misdemeanor.12 The court brushed aside the victim's contention that "criminal
law or statute" was limited "to mean only felonies of a serious nature,
like robbery and murder."'29 An encyclopedic inquiry into the etymological range of "crime" revealed that it included "a misdemeanor, felony,
or act of treason", but did not include "a petty violation of municipal
regulation." 30 This, the court concluded, also comported with the
common and popular understanding of the term.'' The exclusion
therefore applied.'32 Moreover, Georgia public policy posed no impediment to the exercise of party autonomy in this respect. 3
VI.

GENERAL COMMERCIAL LIABILITY POLICIES

Shelby Insurance Co. u. Ford"M is a ringing reaffirmation of the
principle, originally developed by Roman law, that corporations are
juristic persons or legal entities entirely distinct from the individuals
who own their stock. It sends a cautionary message to attorneys who
assist their clients in making business planning decisions.

126. Id. (quoting the policy, with emphasis supplied by court).
127. Id., 445 S.E.2d at 273-74 (citing O.C.G.A. § 25-10-2 (1982)).
128. Id., 445 S.E.2d at 274 (citing O.C.G.A. § 25-10-8 (1982)).
129. Id.
130. Id. (relying on WEBSTER's NEW THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 536 (1976 ed.)).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 323, 455 S.E.2d at 274 (distinguishing Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Neese,
254 Ga. 335, 329 S.E.2d 136 (1985) on the grounds that Neese, unlike the present case,
involved compulsory insurance statutes which impart more confining parameters).
Senseless shooting incidents in or outside of the home continue to engage courts with
frightening regularity. They implicate the "intentional act" exclusion. Sometimes their
facts are so irrefragable as to compel disposition by summary judgment as a matter of law.
See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Moss, 212 Ga. App. 326,441 S.E.2d 809 (1994) and
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Grayes, 216 Ga. App. 419, 454 S.E.2d 616 (1995). Yet, in many cases
they compel a full-dress trial by jury. See, e.g., Southern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mason, 213 Ga.
App. 584, 445 S.E.2d 569 (1994) (a fact issue was presented whether the insured intended
to "harm" or just to "scare" the victim).
For a brief but sharply focused discussion of the public policy ramifications of intentional
act exclusions, see Widiss, Liability Ins. Coverage for Punitive Damages? 39 VILL. L. REV.
455, 460-64 (1994). See generally Rynearson, Exclusion of Expected or Intended Personal
Injury or PropertyDamage Underthe OccurrenceDefinitionof the StandardComprehensive
GeneralLiability Policy, 19 FORUM 513 (1984).
134. 265 Ga. 232, 454 S.E.2d 464 (1995), rev'g Shelby Ins. Co. v, Ford, 212 Ga. App.
303, 441 S.E.2d 764 (1994).
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A child was injured on the premises of a day care center operated by
a subchapter S corporation.135 The president, owner, and sole shareholder of the corporation had obtained a general commercial liability
(GCL) policy which covered her as named insured "but only with respect
to the conduct of a business of which [she was] the sole owner." 3 6 Did
this policy cover the corporation? The supreme court held that it did
not. Ownership of a business could not be equated with ownership of "a
corporate entity which operates a business."3 7 Here the child care
center was owned by the corporation and not by the named insured as
an individual. The policy therefore could not "be enlarged by the court
to include as a named insured a wholly distinct legal entity.""3 8
Accordingly, the corporation, although formed and totally controlled by
the named insured, was not covered under the policy.'39
VII.

HOMEOWNER'S POLICIES--IDENTIFICATION AND RESIDENCE
CLAUSES

Do holders of homeowner's policies lose their coverage when they move
from their homes and cease to "reside" in them? The answer depends on
the precise formulation of the insurance contract at issue and engages
courts in a good deal of case parsing and flogging of surprisingly
nonstandard policy clauses.
In Hill v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,14 an insured home
suffered fire damage two months after the policyholders moved out. The
insurer denied coverage. The policy in question covered "the dwelling on
the residencepremises shown on the Declarations" and defined "residence
premises" as "the one- or two-family dwelling... ; or that part of any
other building where you live, shown as the residence premises on the
Declarations.""" It contained no explicit exclusion from coverage in
case the residence was vacant. The court held that there was coverage. 42 It reasoned that the use of the semi-colon and the disjunctive
"or" in separating the first clause from the second fairly indicated to a
lay reader that the words "where you live" only modified the words "that

135. 265 Ga. at 232, 454 S.E.2d at 465 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 1361(cX1)). On a parity of
reasoning, the rationale of the case applies to all corporations.

136. Id. (quoting all policy).
137. Id. at 233, 454 S.E.2d at 465.
138. Id. at 234, 454 S.E.2d at 466. Three dissenting judges contended that the sole
owner was the intended insured under the language of the policy which had to be strictly
contrued against the insurer. Id. at 234-35, 454 S.E.2d at 466 (Sears, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 234, 454 S.E.2d at 466.
140. 214 Ga. App. 715, 448 S.E.2d 747 (1994).
141. Id. at 715, 448 S.E.2d at 747 (quoting the policy, with emphasis added).
142. Id. at 718, 448 S.E.2d at 749.
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part of any other building" and were inserted in the policy solely to
identify that part of a multi-unit dwelling which was selected for
coverage."' It was thus only an identifying statement and not a
descriptive warranty mandating continued actual residence as a
condition of coverage. Had the insurer's intent been otherwise it would
have positioned the language relating to residence so as to modify the
first clause as well."" The insurer relied on two superficially similar
prior cases which found that continued residence was a requirement for
coverage. In Epps v. Nicholson,141 the policy at issue defined residence
premises as "the one or two family dwelling ...or that part any other
building where you reside." 146 In Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Kephart,47 the court defined residence premises as "a.
the one family dwelling ...; or b. that part of any other building; where
you reside." 148 The court held that these cases were clearly distinguishable because the punctuation as well as the "language and sentence
structure" 149 of the definitions under consideration clearly linked the
phrase where you reside to any and all enumerated insured premises
and thus made residence a condition of continued coverage. 5 '
Beneficent construction has its limits where the policy, as in Kephart,
although not in Nationwide, contains an "exclusive residence" clause in
addition to its identification clause. 5 ' Thus, in Georgia Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Roland,'52 the named insureds under a
homeowner's policy, a married couple resided in their home until October
1990 when they separated, the wife moved out and ultimately obtained
a divorce. 5 3 In March 1991 the home was destroyed by fire."5 4 The
policy contained a "special provision" requiring that "the residence
premises [must be] the only premises where the named insured or spouse
maintains a residence other than business or farm properties."' The

143,

Id. at 717, 448 S.E.2d at 749.

144.

Id., 448 S.E.2d at 748-49.

145. 187 Ga. App. 246, 370 S.E.2d 13 (1988).
146. 214 Ga. App. at 717, 448 S.E.2d at 748-49.
147. 211 Ga. App. 423, 439 S.E.2d 682 (1993), cited by 214 Ga. App. at 718, 448 S.E.2d
at 749.
148. 214 Ga. App. at 718, 448 S.E.2d at 749. Kephart also contained an "only" or
"exclusive" residence clause.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 211 Ga. App. at 426, 439 S.E.2d at 684.
152. 215 Ga. App. 834, 452 S.E.2d 548 (1994).
153. Id. at 835, 452 S.E.2d at 550.
154. Id. at 837, 452 S.E.2d at 551.
155. Id. at 835, 452 S.E.2d at 550 (quoting the policy, with emphasis supplied by court).
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court held that the wife was simply out of luck. 5 ' The special provision unambiguously required her to continue residence at the described
premises and was in fact a continuing representation which had to be
kept good throughout the term of the policy.'57 Although "the result
in this case appears harsh, it is the agreement contracted for by the
parties." 5 ' It did not violate public policy because the language was
in general conformance with the Insurance Commissioner's standard fire
insurance form as contemplated by statute. 159
VIII.

INCONTESTABLE CLAUSES

Incontestable clauses mandated by statute, once the reservat of life
insurance, 160 have in recent decades foliated to include accident and
health policies' 6 ' as well as certain annuity contracts.1 62 They can
be justified in a life insurance integument as the product of a public
policy decision to protect insureds and their presumably innocent
beneficiaries against stale defenses asserted when the insured is no
longer around to refute them. 61 They are less persuasively justified
in other contexts, although the standard explanation seems to be that we
want to penalize lax insurers for failing to investigate the insurability
of their applicants without undue delay.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc. v. Sheehan,64 a case of
first impression in several respects, shows that the incontestable clause
works with the precision of a guillotine in cutting off the insurers'
defenses and other remedies.'65 An HIV positive applicant lied about
his condition in his application and had not made any claims (which
might have revealed his condition) for the requisite two year term. The
court held that the insurer could not rescind or reform the policy after
expiration of the incontestable period, or affirmatively recover for deceit

156. Id. at 838, 452 S.E.2d at 552.
157. Id. See PATTERSON, supra note 74, at 402-06.
158. 215 Ga. App. at 836, 452 S.E.2d at 551.
159. Id., 452 S.E.2d at 550-51 (construing O.C.G.A. § 33-32-1(a) (1990)). See thoughtprovoking dissent by Judge McMurray arguing that the policy at issue sought to debase
the coverage mandated by statute. Id. at 838, 452 S.E.2d at 552 (McMurray, J.,
dissenting).
160. O.C.G.A. § 33-25-3(a)(2) (1990) (individual life policies); Id. § 33-27-3(a)(2) (group
life policies).
161. Id. § 33-29-3(b)(A).
162. Id. § 33-28-2(b)(2). See generally IncontestabilityClauses in Georgia Insurance
Contracts, 13 GA. L. REV. 850 (1979).

163. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 3, at §§ 3.3(c)(3), 6.6(d).
164. 215 Ga. App. 228, 450 S.E.2d 228 (1994).
165. Id. at 229, 450 S.E.2d at 229.
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and obtain damages for sums fraudulently obtained."' 6 It decided that
the health policy's easy reading incontestable clause,' 67 which accurately paraphrased the statutory mandate, 168 clearly cut off any
defense based on misrepresentation. 69 Although it noted that there
was some foreign authority suggesting that the insurer might avoid the
policy for post-application deceit, such as where the insured "fraudulently posed as independent verifier of his health" ° in the course of the
insurer's post-application investigation, it found that this was not the
case here. 7 ' The applicant in question had not made any "selfexposing" claims during the incontestable period because he had no such
claims.'72 He had thus taken no affirmative steps to perpetuate the
deception. 7 '
The court also made short shrift of the insurer's contention that
incontestability clauses in health policies imposed less of an obligation
to investigate the applicant than those in life policies because health
insureds would, in ordinary course, be expected to file claims which
would tend to disclose their prior deception.'74 It concluded that the
obligation to make a prompt investigation was the same under all
incontestable clauses.'75 Despite some foreign authority to the contrary,76 the fraud claim for damages was also deftly disposed of.'7
Such claim "would merely provide a different means to challenge the
validity of the insurance contract""'7 and thus represent an impermissible contest. 7 9

166.
167.

Id. at 230, 450 S.E.2d at 230.
Id. at 228, 450 S.E.2d at 229.

168. O.C.G.A. § 33-29-3(bX2)(A) (1990).
169. 215 Ga. App. at 229, 450 S.E.2d at 230.
170. Id. at 230-31, 450 S.E.2d at 231 (paraphrasing Unity Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moses,
621 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 780 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1985)).
171. Id. at 231, 450 S.E.2d at 231.
172. The insured had a $1,000 deductible and had received his AZT medication for free.
Id. at 231 n.3, 450 S.E.2d at 231 n.3.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 230, 450 S.E.2d at 230.
175. Id. at 231, 450 S.E.2d at 231.
176. See Unity Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moses, 621 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 780 F.2d
1017 (3d Cir. 1985).
177. 215 Ga. App. at 231, 450 S.E.2d at 231.
178. Id, (quoting Bankers Sec. Life Ins. Soc'y v. Kane, 885 F.2d 820, 822 (11th Cir.
1989)).
1,79. Id. at 231-32, 450 S.E.2d at 231. The court rejected the logomachy involved in
contending that a fraud claim was a technical "affirmance" of the contract rather than a
"disaffirmance" or avoidance and thus did not represent an impermissible contest. Id.
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However, given the fact that the case was partially one of first
impression, the insurer's denial of coverage did not expose it to liability
for attorney fees and penalties.18 °
IX.

KEY EXECUTIVE INSURANCE

A promise, for a consideration, to pay a sum of money upon the
promisee's death is not necessarily a life insurance contract. In Primus
Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Glovier, TM a drug company promised its chief
executive officer orally that it would pay his estate one fifth of the
proceeds of a "key man" or key executive life insurance policy which it
had taken out on his life. This was meant to be part of his employment
benefits package." 2 The court held that such an arrangement simply
created a contingent monetary obligation out of a fund "which happened
to be a portion of the proceeds of a policy of which [the obligor] was
It did not qualify the employer as an insurer' nor
beneficiary."'
the contract as a life insurance policy."8 Hence, the specific statutory
requirement that life insurance contracts had to be evidenced by a
writing was not applicable. Furthermore, the contract was not
unenforceable under the one-year rule of the general statute of frauds
because it was by its own terms capable of performance in one year or
less."s
X.

LIABILITY INSURER'S OBLIGATION TO DEFEND CLAIMS

A liability insurer's breach of its contractual duty to defend its insured
may make the insured vulnerable to a greater liability than would have
been imposed had the insurer kept its word. It is settled Georgia law
that the breach entitles the insured to such damages as are traceable to
conduct. Assessment of such damages is a question for the
the insurer's
187
jury.

180. Id. at 232, 450 S.E.2d at 231 (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6 (1992)).
181. 215 Ga. App. 411, 450 S.E.2d 832 (1994).
182. Id. at 411, 450 S.E.2d at 832.
183. Id. at 412, 450 S.E.2d at 834.
184. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-1-2(4) (1992)).
185. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-25-1 (1990)).
186. Id.
187. Leader Natl Ins. Co. v. Kemp & Son, Inc. 259 Ga. 329, 331, 30 S.E.2d 458, 460
(1989). Liability carriers are contractually required to defend their insureds against
actions alleging covered events whether or not the actions are "groundless, false, or
fraudulent." Id. This standard phrase is found in automobile policies, CGL policies, and
in homeowner's floaters. See, e.g., KEETON, supra note 36, at 662 App. H (1971) (1963
revision of the Family Combination Automobile Policy).
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Does the same result arise where the failure to defend is not asserted
by the insured but by the injured party who has obtained a judgment
against the insured by default or otherwise? This novel question
surfaced in Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Martin'88
in which the court of appeals held that the result was the same.189
The insurer was not protected by the limits in its policy. Instead, a jury
would have to determine the extent of its liability which could be
potentially as large as the amount of the judgment secured by the
injured party against the insured.1 90
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals. 9 ' It found that
the insured and the injured party occupy entirely different positions. 92
The insured may actually have suffered harm because of the insurer's
breach while the injured party would be hard-pressed to prove any harm
"since, even if the insurer had done its duty, its maximum liability
would have been the limits of the insurance policy." 9 It followed that
the insurer's
liability to the injured party could not exceed the policy
19 4
limits.

XI. LIFE INSURANCE-RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARIES
In Stephens v. Adkins, 98 the plaintiff brought an action seeking
damages and a declaration that her brother, a co-beneficiary under a
policy on the life of their deceased father, was not entitled to benefit
from the policy because he had been convicted "for the voluntary
manslaughter of the deceased."1 9 She submitted a certified copy of
the jury's verdict. This was countered by her brother's affidavit in which
he averred that the killing was partially in self-defense and partially
caused by accident.19 The court held that the posture of the case at
this stage warranted a partial summary judgment in favor of the
Georgia law specifically
plaintiff on the issue of entitlement. 98
deprives those who commit murder, voluntary manslaughter, or conspire
with another to commit murder any benefits they might otherwise claim

188. 209 Ga. App. 237, 433 S.E.2d 315 (1993).
189. Id. at 239, 433 S.E.2d at 317.
190. Id.

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Martin, 264 Ga. 347,444 S.E.2d 739 (1994).
Id. at 348, 444 S.E.2d at 740-41.
Id. at 351, 444 S.E.2d at 742.
Id.
214 Ga. App. 653, 448 S.E.2d 734 (1994).
Id. at 653, 448 S.E.2d at 734.
Id. at 653-54, 448 S.E.2d at 734.
Id. at 654, 448 S.E.2d at 734.
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under a policy on the life of the deceased.199 "The statute also provides
that a plea of guilty or a judicial finding of guilt not reversed or
otherwise set aside as to the crime is prima facie evidence of guilt in
determining the rights under this Code section."" Hence, the defendant's admissions and exculpatory "conclusionary statements" in his
affidavit did not "present a genuine issue of material fact" as to his guilt
so as to overcome the prima facie evidence presented."0 '
XII. LOAN RECEIPT-PROOF OF Loss
"Loan receipts," it has been said, resemble loans in the same sense
that prairie dogs resemble dogs. Under a loan receipt, the insured
borrows the full amount of compensation for her loss from the insurer
and promises to repay the loan only to the extent of any recovery from
the alleged tortfeasor. The insured remains a real party in interest and
the insurer can bask in its anonymity, because there is no formal
assignment of the underlying cause of action. Jurors dislike insurer
subrogees, and subrogation itself may be invalid as an attempt at
assigning a claim for personal injuries.20 2 At any rate, many states
including Georgia find nothing wrong with the loan receipt even though
they acknowledge it to be a bit of a fiction.2 3
In Powers v. Latimer,2"' a homeowner brought a torts action against
the owner of an airplane which crashed into her home. She sought
damages for property losses and personal injuries suffered by her and
members of her family. Her homeowner's carrier paid her about $70,000
under a loan receipt which required repayment "to the extent she
recovers payment from anyone else" and "that any suit would be
prosecuted in her name under the exclusive directionand control," of her
that the sum
carrier.'
She also signed a proof of loss 2 swearing
°
received represented her whole property lOSS.
Subsequently, the homeowner's carrier settled the property claim with
the alleged tortfeasor's insurer for about $60,000 and released both "from
all liability claims arising from the accident."20 7

199. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-25-13 (1990)).

200. Id. (paraphrasing and relying upon O.C.G.A. § 33-25-13 (1990)).
201. Id., 448 S.E.2d at 734-35.
202. See section on Subrogation and Contribution, infra note 292.
203. See JERRY, supra note 38, at § 96(j).
204. 215 Ga. App. 245, 450 S.E.2d 295 (1994).
205. Id. at 245, 450 S.E.2d at 297 (paraphrasing the policy) (emphasis added).

206. Id.
207. Id.
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What is the effect of these documents? The court found that the loan
receipt was valid despite its manichean qualities. °s It was not a
subrogation agreement or an assignment, and thus allowed the insured
to press the claim in her own name. The insurer's right to direct and
control litigation does not detract from that. It was but a "mechanism
through which the insurance company can protect its own interest in any
recovery."'
The statement in the proof of loss that the sum received from the
insurer represented the insured's entire property loss was, at most, an
admission against interest; it did not preclude an action against the
alleged tortfeasor, particularly an action210for losses that may not have
been covered by the homeowner's policy.
The release of the alleged tortfeasor and his insurer, executed by the
homeowner's carrier in its individual capacity, could not effect the
insured's right to press a property claim against the alleged tortfeasor.
She did not sign the document that had for its sole purpose a release of
the alleged tortfeasor and his insurer "as to any stake" her homeowner's
carrier might have in her claim. 211" The insured may therefore bring
her action against the alleged tortfeasor, but "she is not entitled to a
double recovery."212 Accordingly, any judgment obtained against the
alleged tortfeasor "must be reduced by the amount of [her insurer's]
interest in the case."213
It should be noted in passing that neither the insured's daughter nor
the insured suing on behalf of her daughter was entitled to recover for
negligent infliction of emotional harm. Georgia law still holds that
"recovery is allowed only where there has been some impact on the
14
plaintiff that results in a physical injury.",

XIII. MOTOR COMMON CARRIER-DIRECT ACTION
Georgia's limited direct action statutes, in identical provisions,
218
expressly authorize injured persons to join motor common carriers
or motor contract carriers216 with their respective liability insurance

208. Id.at 246, 450 S.E.2d at 297.
209. Id. (emphasis added).
210. Id., 450 S.E.2d at 298.
211. Id. at 247, 450 S.E.2d at 298. The writings involved did not affect the insured's
right to press her claim for personal injuries because such claims are nonassignable.
212. Id.
213. Id. (relying upon Hall v. Helms, 150 Ga.App. 257, 257 S.E.2d 349 (1979)).
214. Id. at 248, 450 S.E.2d at 299 (relying upon Richardson v. Hennly, 209 Ga. App.
868, 434 S.E.2d 772 (1993)).
215. O.C.G.A. § 46-7-12(e) (1982).
216. Id. § 46-7-58(e).
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2 17
carriers 'inthe same action, whether arising in tort or in contract."
In Westport Trucking Co. v. Griffin,21 the supreme court held that
such actions were not only allowed against intrastate motor contract
carriers but also against contract carriers that were engaged solely in
interstate commerce.2 19 In Williams v. Southern Drayage, Inc.,22
decided during the current survey period, the court found that on a
parity of reasoning and because of the identity of the statutory
provisions, the same rule also applied to interstate motor common
carriers.2 21 This despite the fact that as interstate carriers they are only
required to obtain local registration permits and identification stamps
and do not have to possess a certificate of public convenience and
necessity from the Georgia Public Service Commission.222

XIV NEWLY ACQUIRED AUTOMOBILES
Automobile policies automatically cover newly acquired automobiles
if the insured "notifies the company... within [30] days after the date
of such acquisition of his election to make this ...policy ...applicable

to such automobile." 23 In Noakes v. Atlanta Casualty Cos.,224 the
insured bought a broken down Jeep on February twenty-first. After the
Jeep was made operational again it was involved in a collision on March
twenty-eighth while being taken for a test ride. 225 The insured did not
obtain a certificate of title until March twenty-sixth. She admitted
candidly that she did not notify her insurer during the thirty day period
following the purchase because she did not want to "pay a premium until
she determined whether her husband could repair the Jeep."226 In an
argument which deserves an "A" for ingenuity, she contended that the
notice period did not begin to run until she became an owner of the Jeep,
which did not occur on the date of purchase, but on either the date when

217. Id. § 46-7-12(e), 58(e). Only three states and two United States territories have
limited direct action statutes allowing claimants to join alleged tortfeasors and their
liability carriers before establishing the tortfeasor's liability by judgment or otherwise. See
38, § 84(b).
218. 254 Ga. 361, 329 S.E.2d 487 (1985).
219. Id. at 363, 329 S.E.2d at 489 (holding that O.C.G.A. § 46-7-5(e) (1982) applies to
interstate and intrastate carriers).
220. 213 Ga. App. 895, 446 S.E.2d 758 (1994).
221. Id. at 896, 446 S.E.2d at 759 (construing O.C.G.A. § 46-7-12(e) (1982)).
222. Id. at 895, 446 S.E.2d at 759 (citing O.C.G.A. § 46-7-16(a) (1982)).
223. See KEETON, supra note 36, at 662 App. H, Part I, Definitions - "owned
automobile" (cX2) (1963 revision of the Family Combination Automobile Policy).
224. 215 Ga. App. 398, 450 S.E.2d 861 (1994).
225. Id. at 398, 450 S.E.2d at 862.
226. Id.

JERRY, supra note
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the Jeep was again operational or the later date when she obtained a
certificate of title. The court made short shrift of these contentions.22
"The key to coverage under the policy was the date [the insured] became
the owner, not the date the car came into service as a means of
transportation."2 ' Furthermore, the statute dealing with registration
formalities states that "as between the parties a transfer by an owner is
not effective" until the purchaser obtains "from the transferor the
certificate of title thereto."229 It so happened that the insured did
obtain a certificate from the transferor on February twenty-first, the
date of the purchase. The certificate of title subsequently issued by the
state merely "shows registration of the certificate of title already
transferred by the seller," and is but one of the methods of proving
existing ownership.23 ° Moreover, the statute applies as between the
parties and not, as in the present case as between the purchaser and her
insurer.2 3' 2 Accordingly, the Jeep was not covered at the time of the
3
collision.

XV.

OMNIBUS CLAUSE AND "PERMIrrEES"

Automobile policies in their old iteration covered members of the
insured's household who were relatives of the insured as well as the
insured's bailees or "permittees." The 1955 standard automobile policy
provides coverage for "any person while using the automobile ...
provided that the actual use of the automobile is by the named insured
or such spouse or with the permission of either."2 33 A cognate but
etymologically quite different version provides coverage for "any ...
person while using the owned motor vehicle, provided the operation and
actual use ... are with the permission of the named insured."" 3' The
1963 family combination automobile policy provides coverage for any
other person using such automobile with the permission of the named

Id. at 399, 450 S.E.2d at 862.
Id.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 40-3-32(d) (1982)) (emphasis supplied by court).
Id., 450 S.E.2d at 863.
Id., 450 S.E.2d at 862-63.
Id., 450 S.E.2d at 863.
See J. AUSTIN & N. RISJORD, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES STANDARD
PROVISIONS and app. 19 (1964) (emphasis added); see also Strickland v. Georgia Cas. & Sur.
Co., 224 Ga. 487, 162 S.E.2d 421 (1968) (holding that there is coverage if an authorized
"user" turns the wheel over to an "operator" without specific authorization).
234. See DeWorken v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 151 Ga. App. 248,249,259 S.E.2d 490,
491-92 (1979) (emphasis different from original) (holding that a permittee's permittee was
not covered because both "operation" and "use" had to be authorized).
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
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insured, provided his actual operation or (if he is not operating) his other
actual use thereof is within the scope of such permission.23
The 1985 standard personal auto policy, one of a spate of new-wave
easy reading policies that are now beginning to percolate through our
appellate system, marks a departure in substance and structure from old
iterations. It includes in its coverage clause as additionally insured
"[any person using your covered auto,"23 but then excludes "any
person ... [ulsing a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that person
is entitled to do so."2"7 The old versions, regardless of variant embroidery, have one issue in common: they focus on the named insured and
the circumstances surrounding the grant of permission. The new version
focuses on the subjective state of mind of the permittee as measured by
the objective standard of reasonableness.
Two cases dealt with the new version. In Miller v. Southern Heritage
Insurance Co.,2"' the insured held a policy covering a car that was
mainly used by his son. The car was involved in a collision while it was
being driven by a fifteen-year old who held only a learner's permit and
was not accompanied by an adult as mandated by law.239 The fifteenyear old had been allowed to operate the car by the son, the authorized
user of the car. Despite this fact, the court held that the driver was
excluded from coverage under the new 1985 policy."0 "As a matter of
law, [the fifteen-year old] cannot be considered to have had any
'reasonable belief' that he was entitled to drive the car."2" In a
similar vein, the court held in Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Plummer 42
that the same exclusion also applied to close relatives of the insured who
were members of the insured's household.2 43 There was no coverage
where a fourteen-year old without a license clandestinely obtained the
car keys while her parents were asleep, rolled the car silently out of the

235. See KEEToN &WIDIss supra note 3, at 1117 app. H(1). The use of the disjunctive
"or" suggests that the permittee's permittee may be covered if the vehicle is "used" by (i.e.
dedicated to the purpose of) the "permittee," at least in the absence of an express
prohibition.
236. Id. at 1122 app. H(2) Insuring Agreement 2.
237. Id. at 1123 app. H(2) Exclusions A.8.
238. 215 Ga. App. 173, 450 S.E.2d 432 (1994).
239. Id. at 173, 450 S.E.2d at 433 (citing O.C.G.A. § 40-5-24(a) (1982)).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 176, 450 S.E.2d at 435. It should be noted that this was but one of several
different issues raised in the case.
242. 213 Ga. App. 265, 444 S.E.2d 378 (1994).
243. Id. at 266, 444 S.E.2d at 380.
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driveway, and then started careening around the neighborhood until she
collided with an embankment at 5:00 a.m. 2",
Finally, two cases had to cope with different but not disparate new
versions of commercial automobile insurance.
Massachusetts Bay Insurance Co. v. Wooten 5 involved a policy
which extended coverage to "[alnyone [other than you] while using with
your permission a covered 'auto' you own,"2 46 but apparently did not
include a "reasonable belief' exclusion. One of the insured's employees
had taken a company car after business hours for a bit of pub-crawling
at 8:40 p.m. and was involved in a collision at 2:00 a.m. in which he was
killed. He was, at that time, in a highly inebriated state.247 Despite
some contradictory evidence, the insurer, in the court's view, presented
a prima facie case that the employee "was driving the vehicle for a
personal use.., and that such personal use was expressly forbidden by
the employer."24 This authorized a jury finding of noncoverage, and
thus made it error for the trial court to direct a verdict for the administrator of the employee's estate. The court also found that permission
clauses have been consistently upheld as comporting with public policy
at least in those cases which involved express prohibitions.24 9 This
despite the 1977 compulsory insurance regime which introduced the
policy that "innocent persons who are injured should have adequate
recourse for the recovery of their damages."25 ' It was therefore error
for the trial court to direct a verdict251"on the ground that the permission
clause is violative of public policy."
The court conceded in passing that, in cases "where an expressly
forbidden use is not involved," 252 the pro-compensation bias of the
compulsory insurance regime may arguably require the adoption of the
first instance permission ("hell or high water") rule which covers
virtually any deviation so long as initial permission to use a vehicle is

244. Id. at 265, 444 S.E.2d at 379. The minor in this case lacked permission, express
or implied. In fact, permission had been explicitly refused in the past. Accord Cincinnati
Ins. Co. v. Mullinax, 215 Ga. App. 331,450 S.E.2d 336 (1994) (involving two 15-year olds).
245. 215 Ga. App. 386, 450 S.E.2d 857 (1994).
246. Id. at 387, 450 S.E.2d at 858-59 (quoting the policy) (emphasis added).
247. Id., 450 S.E.2d at 859.
248. Id. at 388, 450 S.E.2d at 859 (emphasis supplied by court).

249. Id. at 387, 450 S.E.2d at 858-59.
250. Id. at 386, 450 S.E.2d at 858 (quoting Anderson v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co.,
251 Ga. 556, 557, 307 S.E.2d 499, 500 (1983)).
251. Id. at 387, 450 S.E.2d at 859.
252. Id. at 386, 450 S.E.2d at 858 (emphasis supplied by court).
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given by the insured,253 and thus partially voids permission clauses.
This, however, was for another case and another time.254
Williams v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.255 involved

a hybrid policy providing coverage for "[alnyone else while using with
your permission a covered 'auto'," but excluding the use of "a vehicle
without ...

express permission ...

or if permission is granted, acting

outside of the scope of said permission."256 A business owner allowed
an occasional employee to take an insured Chevrolet van to pick up the
employee's cousins "to perform some work for [the owner]." 257 When
the day's work was done the employee took his cousins home. He stayed
there for an hour and then used the van to go to a pizza restaurant and
to stop at a liquor store for a major purchase. Both errands involved a
"detour from his direct route home."258 There was conflict in the
evidence about whether permission to pick up his cousins carried with
it permission to take them home. But, even assuming that such permission was present, there was no doubt that his peregrinations "deviated
259
substantially from the scope of his permission to use the vehicle."
Hence, the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the insurer
demanded affirmance.26 °
XVI.

PROCEDURE-REFORMATION IN EQUITY AND DECLARATORY
RELIEF

Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Woodruff6 ' is a pastiche
which has about it the uncomfortable realities of accepted modem
behavior. An insured bought coverage for his three vehicles. Subsequently, he had one of the vehicles, a Toyota pickup truck, deleted from
the policy. After he collided with a bicyclist while driving the Toyota, he
requested his insurer to add the Toyota back to the policy without
enlightening the insurer about his mishap. The insurer issued an
amended declaration and, according to its standard practice, backdated
it to 12:01 a.m. on the date of issue.262 Literally this meant that the
insured was now covered because the accident had occurred exactly
253. Id. at 386-87, 450 S.E.2d at 858.
254. Id. at 388,450 S.E.2d at 859 ("we need not reach the question of whether the first
instance permission rule should be adopted as the law of this state").
255. 213 Ga. App. 128, 443 S.E.2d 711 (1994).
256. Id. at 129, 443 S.E.2d at 712 (quoting the policy) (emphasis supplied by court).
257. Id. at 128, 443 S.E.2d at 712.
258. Id. at 129, 443 S.E.2d at 712.
259. Id. at 130, 443 S.E.2d at 713.
260. Id.
261. 215 Ga. App. 511, 451 S.E.2d 106 (1994).
262. Id. at 511, 451 S.E.2d at 107.
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nineteen minutes after 12:01 a.m. on the date of issue. The insurer was
granted reformation in equity so as to give the policy only prospective
effect.2 '3 The court explained that there was no mutual mistake,2' but
there was an actionable unilateral mistake on the part of the insurer. 65 The insured's failure to disclose the accident, coupled with the
fact that he should have known that he would not be able to secure
coverage for an accident that had already occurred, constituted
"inequitable
conduct"26 6 and demanded reformation on behalf of the
2 67
insurer.

Declaratory judgments abound in insurance litigation, but they are not
all-purpose remedies, as is demonstrated by Miller v. Southern Heritage
Insurance Co. 8 After an automobile collision engineered by a fifteenyear old driver, the presumed liability carrier made a preliminary
payment of about $11,000 to cover the victim's medical expenses. When
settlement negotiations broke down it filed an action against the victim
seeking, inter alia, a declaration that it was not obligated to pay for any
of the medical expenses by law or contract.2" 9 It had simply made the
payment under the mistaken assumption that it could not rely upon the
unauthorized driver exclusion in its policy because it was, under any
circumstances, compelled to furnish the minimum coverage of up to
$15,000 as mandated by statute.27 ° Its decision to pay had been
informed by judicial precedent of uncertain compass. 1 The court
made a declaration of its own when it held that this was a misuse of the
declaratory judgment,272 which was designed "to permit determination
of a controversy before obligations are repudiated or rights are violated."273 Since the insurer did "not need guidance" for actions already
taken, the declaratory judgment was only advisory, and a solution of an
artificial controversy which was created, not by the underlying facts, but
by the very filing of the declaratory judgment action itself2 4 The
insurer should either have filed its action before making the payment or

263. Id. at 513, 451 S.E.2d at 108.
264. Id. at 512,451 S.E.2d at 107 (the insurer's backdating practice risked such result).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 23-2-32(b) (1982)). There was also no evidence whatsoever
of prejudice on the part of the insured.
268. 215 Ga. App. 173, 450 S.E.2d 432 (1994).
269. Id. at 173, 450 S.E.2d at 433.
270. O.C.G.A. § 40-9-37 (1990).
271. 215 Ga. App. at 174, 450 S.E.2d at 434 (citations omitted).
272. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-4-1 (1982)).
273. Id. (quoting Famble v. State Farm Ins. Co., 204 Ga. App. 332, 333-34, 419 S.E.2d
143, 145 (1992)).
274. Id.
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sought vindication of its "right" to reimbursement by filing an action for
restitution after making the payment.27 Accordingly, the trial court's
grant of the insurer's motion for summary judgment was in error to the
extent that it spoke to the insurer's "liability for sums already paid," and
was thus subject to partial reversal.27 6
XVII.

PROPERTY INSURANCE-COVERAGE AND INSURABLE INTEREST

Divorce may wreak havoc upon the legal relationships of unsuspecting
parties. Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Haire27 7 is a paradigmatic case justifying this observation. A husband and wife owned a home
jointly but had it insured solely in the wife's name. The husband was
an additional insured as his wife's relative residing in her houseSubsequently, they divorced and a settlement agreement
hold.'
incorporated in the decree required the wife to convey to her former
husband "all her rights, title, and interest in the property known as the
marital residence,"279 in return for "one half (1/2) of the net equity not
to exceed $1,500.00, "2s1if and when the home was sold. The wife
conveyed her share as required and moved out. Subsequent to the
divorce and after the husband had moved back into the home as its sole
resident, the home was totally destroyed by fire. The insurer paid the
mortgagee as loss payee, presumably under a standard or union
mortgage clause, and paid the former wife's equity of $1,500. 2"'
Could the husband collect his equity in the home of which he was now
the sole owner? The court held emphatically that he could not. 82
Although he obviously had an insurable interest in his property at the
time of the casualty, he was no longer an additional insured under his
former wife's policy because he no longer qualified as her relative. He
should have made a timely request of the insurer to substitute his name

275. Id. at 175, 450 S.E.2d at 435. Restitution is not a remedy incidental or ancillary
to declaratory relief. The law of restitution was tailored by Lord Mansfield in Moses v.
Macferlan (Macpherlan), K.B. 1760, W.BL. 219, 96 Eng. Rep. 120 (K.B. 1760). Burr. 1005,
97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760). Although based on equitable principles ("ex aequo et bono"),
it is generally enforced by actions at law seeking purely monetary relief ("indebitatus
assumpsit") and only rarely by traditional equitable relief, such as specific restitution
(equitable replevin) or cancellation to prevent unjust enrichment.
276. Id. at 177, 450 S.E.2d at 435.
277. 214 Ga. App. 799, 449 S.E.2d 161 (1994).
278. Id. at 800, 450 S.E.2d at 162.
279. Id. (quoting the settlement agreement).
280. Id. (quoting the settlement agreement).

281. Id.
282. Id. at 801, 450 S.E.2d at 163.
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for that of his former wife as the named insured." 3 What is sad about
this case is that the husband "never saw the policy ... [and] just took

it for granted that [he]
was on the policy," which is certainly not an
284
scenario.
uncommon
XVIII.

STACKING OF COVERAGES

Whether pyramiding, aggregating, or stacking of coverage is available
or even required when two or more policies are present upon the same
risk depends upon the particular line or type of insurance, upon
legislative policy and its perception, and upon the language of the
policies at issue.2 "4 In Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Shook,22 an insurer had issued three separate liability policies on
three separate family automobiles. Each of them provided that "[i]f this
policy and any other auto ...policy issued to you by us apply to the

same accident; the maximum limit of our liability under all the policies
shall not exceed the highest applicable limit under any one policy.". 7
Pretermitting the question whether the policies were in fact present
upon the risk when one of the members of the insureds' family had an
accident, the court held that the provision had to be given a literal
construction. 8 8 Under no circumstances could the insurer's liability
exceed $25,000, the maximum liability provided in each policy. But for
this language, stacking of coverages up to the amount of the insured's
expenses would have been allowed because it does not contravene
Georgia law.28 9
The court also held that the insurer's failure to rely specifically upon
this policy provision in its motion for summary judgment did not waive
the issue for purposes of the present appeal.2 9 The policies in question were all made part of the record below and it was now up to the
court of appeals to construe them as a matter of law.291

283. Id. (distinguishing Republic Ins. Co. v. Martin, 182 Ga. App. 390, 355 S.E.2d 694
(1987) where an attempt to do so was made).
284. Id. at 800, 450 S.E.2d at 162.
285. See N. TERRY,"Stackingof Benefits,"No-FaultTreatise § 33.00-33.300, at 33-1 to
33-92; see also Janet B. Jones, Annotation, Combining or "Stacking"UninsuredMotorist
CoveragesProvidedIn PoliciesIssued By Different Insurers To Different Insureds,28 A.L.R.
4th 362 (1984).
286. 215 Ga.App. 66, 449 S.E.2d 658 (1994).
287. Id. at 67, 449 S.E.2d at 659 (quoting the policies) (emphasis added).
288, Id.
289. Id. Stacking or aggregating beyond the amount of the loss sustained would, of
course, violate the indemnity principle.
290. Id.at 67-68, 449 S.E.2d at 659.
291. Id. at 68, 449 S.E.2d at 659-60.
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SUBROGATION AND CONTRIBUTION

Can an insured recover from a car dealer for defective repairs after
she has been paid her collision losses by her first-party insurance
carrier? This simple but surely not uncommon question surfaced in
292 The court held that the
Nalley Northside Chevrolet, Inc. v. Herring.
insured had standing to sue the dealer because the insurei had only paid
her for loss to the car caused by the other driver and not for damages
2 93
she might have subsequently suffered at the hands of the dealer.
To the extent that the insurer had any rights to subrogation, they were
only available against the other driver.2" Since the case is a veritable
A.L.R. Annotation on the array of substantive and procedural errors that
may impede or derail effective insurance litigation, it seems worthwhile
to catalogue some of them by way of an advisory.
First, while a single act may constitute a breach of contract and a tort
where there is a duty "independent of the contract"29 owed to the
promisee, the mere negligent performance of a contract does not also
constitute a tort.296 Hence, separate awards for breach of contract and
for negligence in its performance amount to impermissible duplication
of damages. 9 ' However, compensatory or punitive damages for an
intentional tort in connection with the contract, such as fraud, are
permissible.29
Second, while the admission of evidence is primarily left to the sound
discretion of the trial court, it was improper to admit testimony
"concerning past fraudulent parts conversion"2 by the dealer because
the specific allegations of fraud in this case did not even allude to any
automotive parts conversion.
Third, it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury on
constructive fraud in a case seeking only legal relief in the form of
monetary damages. 00 Constructive fraud is an equitable doctrine
available in connection with equitable relief.30'

292.
293.
294.

215 Ga. App. 185, 450 S.E.2d 452 (1995).
Id. at 186, 450 S.E.2d at 454.
Id.

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

301.

Id.

188, 450 S.E.2d at 456.
189, 450 S.E.2d at 456.
186, 450 S.E.2d at 454.
187, 450 S.E.2d at 455.
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Fourth, it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury on civil
conspiracy in the absence of any evidence in the record indicating such
conspiracy."' Evidence that the dealership, as a corporation, may
have engaged in harmful conduct in collaboration with one of its
employees does not amount to evidence of conspiracy unless it is also
shown that the employee had stepped outside the scope of his agency,
"because a corporation cannot conspire with itself."3
Insurers still have to tread gingerly when they seek subrogation for
payments of personal injury claims. Despite compelling authority and
arguments to the contrary,8°4 subrogation agreements that are somehow bottomed upon assignments of an underlying personal injury claim,
no matter how deftly and defensively drafted,"'5 are frequently unenforceable or at least suspect.3°6
In Georgia they are in violation of statute,0 7 as is again evidenced
by Southern General Insurance Co. v. Ezekiel."8 An auto insurer, who

had paid its insured under the medical expense rider of its policy, sought
subrogation against the other insured and its liability insurer.0 9 The
easy reading policy in question provided in pertinent part that "we are
entitled to all the rights of recovery which the person to whom payment
was made may have against another person,"3 10 and required the
insured to complete all legal documents to effectuate that right.311 The
court held that this was an impermissible assignment and thus
precluded the insurer from suing the alleged tortfeasor and his insurer
as posing as a real party in interest. 12 An identical decision had been
reached in a previous case in which the language involved read that "we
have the right to sue or otherwise recover the loss from anyone else who

302. Id. at 188, 450 S.E.2d at 455.
303. Id.

304. See Spenser L. Kimball &Don A.Davis, The Extension of InsuranceSubrogation,
60 MICH. L. REv. 841, 866-68 (1962).

305. Compare Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reitler, 628 P.2d 667 (Mont. 1981) (rights of recovery
cannot be assigned) and Allstate Ins. Co. v. Druke, 576 P.2d 489 (Ariz. 1978) (rights to the
"proceeds" of any recovery cannot be assigned).
306. See KEETON & WIDIss, supra note 3, § 3.10(aX7) for three distinct judicial views

regarding the assignment of personal injury claims.
307. O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24 (1982). But see, e.g. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(f) (1992) (allowing
general subrogation in regard to uninsured motorist claims).
308. 213 Ga. App. 665, 445 S.E.2d 807 (1984).

309. Id. at 665, 445 S.E.2d at 807.
310. Id., 445 S.E.2d at 808 (quoting the policy) (emphasis added).

311. Id.
312. Id. at 665-66, 445 S.E.2d at 808.

INSURANCE

1995)

may be responsible.""'3 This decision was found controlling because
the language of the subrogation provisions was essentially the same. 14
Attempts at distinguishing "rights to sue or otherwise recover" from
"rights of recovery", and torturing the latter into a mere right to
reimbursement, were no more than "flights of semantic fancy." '
It is an old axiom that subrogation (or restitution) is not available to
a volunteer. Nevertheless, cases keep surfacing where the factual
matrix appears to bemuse their protagonists. Allianz Insurance Co. v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co."'6 involved a lessor's policy which
concededly provided excess insurance to the lessor beyond the primary
insurance policy purchased by the lessee of a Mercedes Benz which
designated the lessor as an additional insured loss payee. 3 7 After the
primary insurer denied a theft claim on the grounds that its investigation disclosed that the lessee had "conspired to cause or caused the
damage to the vehicle,"31 ' the lessor's excess insurer paid the lessor's
claim for loss in an amount approximating $110,000. Was the lessor's
excess insurer entitled to subrogation against the primary insurer? The
court answered this question in the negative because the excess insurer
was not legally obligated to make the payment, and thus occupied the
position of a mere volunteer.319 This conclusion was further buttressed
by an exclusion in the excess insurance contract which stated "[wie will
not pay the 'loss' if the lessee's insurance company fails to pay the actual
cash value of the 'leased auto.'"320
XX.

TEMPORARY INSURANCE-BINDERS

An oral or written binder is issued by general or independent agents
with limited underwriting authority. It provides temporary insurance
pending the processing of the application for permanent insurance. In
Georgia, a binder is not "valid beyond the issuance of the policy with

313. Id. at 665, 445 S.E.2d at 808 (quoting from Government Employees Ins. Co. v.
Hirsh, 211 Ga. App. 374, 439 S.E.2d 59 (1993)) (emphasis added).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 665-66, 445 S.E.2d at 808 (emphasis added).
316. 214 Ga. App. 666, 449 S.E.2d 5 (1994).
317. Id. at 666, 449 S.E.2d at 5.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 667, 449 S.E.2d at 6.
320. Id. (quoting the policy); see also Carden v. Burckhalter, 214 Ga. App. 487, 448
S.E.2d 251 (1994) (an insured could not lodge a claim for contribution against alleged joint
tortfeasors based on payments which his liability carrier had made to the victims without
the insured's consent. Such payments were made in the capacity of independent
contractor).
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respect to which it was given or beyond [ninety] days from its effective
date, whichever period is the shorter."3 21
What happens to an already issued binder when the insured's check
for the first premium bounces? This depends on the language of the
binder. In McDuffie v. Criterion Casualty Co.,322 an insurer issued a
binder in response to a general application for insurance which, in
pertinent part, provided that "check drafts, and money orders are
accepted subject to collection only" and that the applicant agreed, "if my
premium remittance is not honored by the bank, no coverage will
exist." 23 The court held that dishonor of the applicant's premium
check by her bank made the binder void ab initio.324 Although payment of the first premium is not normally a condition precedent to the
validity of an insurance contract, it can be raised to the level of a
condition by the contract itself. Binders are "created for the convenience
of the insured"32 and are "governed by the ordinary rules of contract
construction."3 2' Despite a judicial preference for construing conditions
as subsequent rather than precedent because of the less devastating
effect of the former, the particular language of the condition at issue
made it a condition precedent. Since the exercise of party autonomy in
this context was not contrary to Georgia law, the condition precedent
was enforceable.32 Accordingly, dishonor of the check voided coverage
at its very inception. 28
In Southern Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Ragan Insurance Agency,
Inc.,329 the court dealt with the duration of the coverage provided by
binders. Shorn of their extraneous detail, the facts showed that a
building contractor had applied for three-year business automobile
policies on his vehicles, received a written binder from the insurer's
agent 330° and signed a premium finance agreement leaving it to the
agent to fill in certain blanks when precise figures on total premiums,

321.
322.

O.C.G.A. § 33-24-33(b) (1990).
214 Ga. App. 818, 449 S.E.2d 133 (1994).

323. Id. at 819, 449 S.E.2d at 134 (quoting the application) (emphasis added).
Id. at 821, 449 S.E.2d at 136.
325. Id. at 820, 449 S.E.2d at 135 (quoting Fort Valley Coca-Cola Co. v. Lumbermen's
Mut. Cas. Co., 69 Ga. App. 120, 124, 24 S.E.2d 846, 849 (1943)).
326. Id.
327. Id. at 821, 449 S.E.2d at 136.
328. Id., 449 S.E.2d at 135-36.
329. 212 Ga. App. 690, 442 S.E.2d 871 (1994).
330. Id. at 691, 442 S.E.2d at 873. The agent was probably an "independent agent"
with representational contracts furnishing underwriting authority for two or more insurers,
rather than an "insurance broker" who represents the insurance consumer and has but a
"hunting license" to secure or place suitable insurance for his principal. The opinion is not
clear on this point.
324.
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down payment, and the like would become known."' 1 The agent
received the permanent policies from the insurer and completed the
premium finance documents. After several attempts to collect the
downpayment by mail and in person proved futile, the agent sent the
policies back to the insurer, 32 The contractor did not know about the
agent's receipt of the policies and admitted candidly in his testimony
that he did not "believe that he had obtained permanent coverage."333
The court held that there was no coverage for an accident involving one
of the contractor's vehicles which occurred more than ninety days after
the binder was issued." The binder had expired335by its own terms and
the permanent policies had not become effective.
XXI.

TITLE INSURANCE

It is barely regulatTitle insurance is a hybrid and a curiosity.3
37
It does not fit any of the three traditional and now somewhat
ed.
obsolescent insurance classifications 8 ' which contemplate insurance
against loss-producing contingent events that occur after formation of
the insurance contract. Title insurance relates to past events in the
sense that it encompasses information deficiencies concerning rights that
have their origins in the past. It is the loss-producing assertion or
discovery of such rights after the contract is formed which may be
viewed as the covered contingent event.
In Chicago Title Insurance Co. v.Investguard, Ltd., a case of first
impression, the court faced the issue whether the discovery that insured
land was located in a flood plain revealed a title defect amounting to
unmarketability of title and was thus covered by a title insurance
policy.34° The court aligned itself with foreign precedents which held
that there was a clear distinction between "economic ...marketability,

which relates to physical conditions affecting the use of the property,

331. Id. at 691-92, 442 S.E.2d at 873.
332. Id. at 693, 442 S.E.2d at 874.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-24-33(b) (1990)).
336. See, e.g., Louis M. Brown, Insured Legal Opinions, 36 CAL. ST. B.J. 411 (1961),
reprinted in 1961 Insurance Law Journal712 (1961).
337. In Georgia the field of title insurance rates a seven-line definition (O.C.G.A. § 337-8 (1992)) and occasional reference (e.g., O.C.G.A. § 33-39-2(d) providing that the
information and disclosure act is not applicable to title insurance).
338. These are life, fire and marine, and casualty insurance. See KEETON, supra note
36, § 1.3(a), 1.3(h).
339. 215 Ga. App. 121, 449 S.E.2d 681 (1994).
340. Id. at 121, 449 S.E.2d at 682.
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and title marketability, which relates to defects affecting legally
recognized rights and incidents of ownership."34 Accordingly, it held
that although the land in question may be valueless by virtue of its
location, this fact did not affect its legal marketability."42
XXII.

UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED COVERAGE

The Georgia Uninsured Motorist Act343 has again proved reliably
litigation prone. It swallowed up about thirteen percent of all appellate
judge time allocated to insurance cases.
A.

Nonduplication of Benefits Clauses and Setoffs

In Northbrook Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Merchant,3 44 a
case of first impression, the court addressed the question whether an
uninsured motorist carrier ("UMC") could enforce a provision in its policy
which reduced payments of uninsured motorist benefits "by the amount
of benefits an 'insured' is entitled to receive for the same elements of loss
under any workers' compensation law."345 The court held that, despite
legislative silence on this issue, such contractual setoffs did not violate
Georgia public policy because they did not frustrate the object of the
Uninsured Motorist Act, which was to protect insureds only to the extent
of their actual losses.34
B.

Phantom Cars and Hit-and-Run Vehicles

A 1983 amendment of the Uninsured Motorist Act dispensed with the
actual physical contact requirement for UM coverage whenever "the
description by the claimant of how the occurrence occurred [sic) is
corroborated by an eyewitness to the occurrence other than the
claimant." u 7 This has produced tons of judicial gloss and still clamors
for fine-tuning. In Meridith v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance
Co.,S" the contract/corroboration test was met even though the corroborating affidavit diverged in some respects from the UM insured's own

341. Id. at 123, 449 S.E.2d at 683 (relying upon Chicago Ttle Ins. Co. v. Kumar, 506
N.E.2d 154 (1987)).
342. Id.
343. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (1992 & Supp. 1994).
344. 215 Ga. App. 273, 450 S.E.2d 425 (1994).
345. Id. at 275, 450 S.E.2d at 427 (quoting the policy) (emphasis added).
346. Id.
347. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(bX2) (1992) (emphasis added). For an A.L.R. type discussion
of judicial and statutory approaches to the intractable problem of the "phantom" vehicle
see Pin Pin H. Su v. Kemper Ins. Cos., 431 A.2d 416 (R.I. 1981).
348. 215 Ga. App. 286, 450 S.E.2d 322 (1994).
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So long as the eyewitness implicates the unidentified

vehicle "as a causal factor in the ...

occurrence," 350 it did not matter

that his evidence may in some respects fail to support the UM insured's
description or even contradict it. Such discrepancies are for the jury to
sort out and could not serve as a basis for a grant of summary judgment
to the insurer. 51 The same test was not met in Bone v.State Farm
Mutual Insurance Co. 52 where the eyewitness observed the allegedly
implicated fast moving unidentified Volkswagen just before the crash
and saw the results of the crash shortly thereafter. However, she did
not see the Volkswagen cross the center line or observe the crash
itself,5 3 and was thus unable to "corroborate how the occurrence
occurred. "35
C.

Release and Settlement
The UMC's obligation to pay benefits is triggered by establishing that
the insured is legally entitled to compensation from the tortfeasor.355
It is measured by the "difference between the available coverages under
...liability insurance ... and the limits of the uninsured motorist

coverage."35 6 An UMC paying benefits is "subrogatedto the rights of
the insured.., against the person causing.., injury, death, or damage
to the extent that payment was made."3 57
What is the posture of affairs when the UM insured, after an accident,
releases the alleged tortfeasor and his liability carrier for a small sum,
which presumably constitutes the limit of the liability policy available,
and then proceeds to file an action against the alleged tortfeasor in order
to recover his actual and presumably much larger damages? This
scenario, which was curiously enough a case of first impression in this
state, engaged the court in Darby u. Mathis.358 An examination of the
document signed by the UM insured revealed that it was an omnibus
release and settlement covering "any and all claims, demands, rights,
and causes of action, of whatsoever kind or nature."5 9 Hence, the

349. Id. at 288, 450 S.E.2d at 324.
350. Id. at 287,450 S.E.2d at 324 (quoting and relying upon Garrett v. Standard Guar.
Ins. Co., 201 Ga. App. 251, 252, 410 S.E.2d 806, 807 (1991)).
351. Id.at 287-88, 450 S.E.2d at 324.
352. 215 Ga. App. 782, 452 S.E.2d 523 (1994).
353. Id, at 783, 452 S.E.2d at 524.
354. Id.
355. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(1) (1992 & Supp. 1994).
356. Id. § 33-7-11(b)(1)(D)(ii).
357. Id. § 33-7-11(f) (emphasis added).
358. 212 Ga. App. 444, 441 S.E.2d 905 (1994).
359. Id. at 445, 441 S.E.2d at 906 (quoting the release).
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insured's claim that it was but a partial release applying only to
"negligence and not to any wilful or intentional act"36° was disingenuous. The vehicular and comprehensive language produced a total and
general release of the alleged tortfeasor as well as his liability insurer
and barred any action against them."'1 Did it also bar the UM insured
from any recovery from his UMC which was duly served in the torts
action? The court held emphatically that it did. 6 2 The UMC was only
liable for benefits if its insured showed that he was "legally entitled to
recover" from the uninsured motorist.36 3 "It [was] therefore a condition
precedent to the action against [the] uninsured motorist carrier 'that a
suit shall have been brought and judgment recovered against the
uninsured motorist."' 3" The court observed that the UM insured
would have achieved his aim had he settled for a partial release
"conditioned on the reservation of whatever rights and interests the
3 65
(UMC). .. might have or claim thereafter against the tortfeasor."
One might note in passing that Georgia now has a limited release
statute36 6 which allows the UM insured to settle with a single liability
carrier for the full policy limit when two or more such carriers are
present upon the risk. 67 Such limited settlement releases the settling
carrier and its insured from all claims and all personal liability "except
to the extent other insurance coverage is available which covers such
claim." 3 1 UMCs are expressly enjoined from prohibiting such limited
settlements in their policies.369 The statute has yet to be construed.
It appears to be a bit infelicitously drafted and may thus yield a few
judicial surprises in the future.
D.

Service upon the UMC

Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Kilgore,37 involved
the following simplified scenario: An injured UM insured filed an action
against the alleged tortfeasors a little over seven months after an

360. Id. at 444, 441 S.E.2d at 906.
361. Id. at 445, 441 S.E.2d at 907.
362. Id. at 446, 441 S.E.2d at 907.
363. Id., 441 S.E.2d at 908.
364. Id. at 445,441 S.E.2d at 907 (quoting Williams v. Thomas, 187 Ga. App. 527,52829, 370 S.E.2d 773, 774-75 (1988)) (emphasis in original).
365. Id. at 446, 441 S.E.2d at 907.
366. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1 (Supp. 1994), 1992 Ga. Laws 2514. This law is inapplicable
to the case sub judice because of the facts and the time frame.
367. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1(a) (Supp. 1994).
368. Id. § 33-24-41.1(b).
369. Id. § 33-24-41.1(c) (effective after July 1, 1994).
370. 216 Ga. App. 384, 454 S.E.2d 587 (1995).
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automobile collision. She then waited another fifteen months to serve
a duplicate original of the complaint upon her UMC. This service,
although initiated more than two weeks before the expiration of the
statute of limitations on the claim against the alleged tortfeasors, could
not be perfected by the sheriff until two days after the expiration
because the UMC's "registered agent was out of the country."37 1 The
court reaffirmed that late service after the claim is time-barred is
curable and relates back to the date of the timely filed action unless it
is caused by the plaintiff's lack of diligence.37 This requires a fact
specific inquiry into the plaintiff's conduct between the date the action
is filed and the date it is served.7 3 The plaintiff contended that the
delay in service was justified because she did not know that she had a
claim against her UMC until the alleged tortfeasor's liability carrier had
established noncoverage in a pending declaratory judgment action. This
fallacy was roundly rejected. 74 She had not been diligent. A lack of
diligence, however, would have been irrelevant had she filed and served
her complaint within the limitation.3 75 Under the facts of this case,
her failure to perfect timely service, despite timely attempts to do so,
was not due to her lack of diligence, but to the unavailability of the
UMC's process agent.376 Hence, the trial court was authorized, in the
exercise of its discretion, to deny the UMC's motion to dismiss for
untimely service. 377
E. Sovereign Immunity
Is it necessary for insureds to obtain a judgment against known or
unknown uninsured motorists in order to perfect their rights against
their UMCs? The answer is generally yes. 7 ' Yet, in Tinsley v.
Worldwide Insurance Co., the court precisely defined the available
exceptions.3 7
After suffering injuries in a collision with a police
cruiser, the insured filed a torts action against the City of Valdosta, its
police department, and the officer involved. After summary judgment

371. Id. at 387, 454 S.E.2d at 589.
372. Id. at 386,454 S.E.2d at 589 (citing and relying upon Williams v. Colonial Ins. Co.,
199 Ga. App. 760, 406 S.E.2d at 99 (1991)).
373. Id. (not only between the date the claim became time-barred and the date of
service, as the trial court had assumed).
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 386-87, 454 S.E.2d at 589.
377. Id. at 387, 454 S.E.2d at 589.
378. Boles v. Hamrick, 194 Ga. App. 595, 391 S.E.2d 418 (1990) (construing O.C.G.A.
§ 33-7-11(a)(1) (1992)).
379. 212 Ga. App. 809, 442 S.E.2d 877 (1994).
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for defendants on the grounds of sovereign and official immunity, the
UMC, which had been properly served with a copy of the action, received
a grant of summary judgment on the grounds that its insured had failed
to obtain a judgment establishing his entitlement to compensation.3"
The court held that summary judgment in favor of the UMC was
error.3"' While a judgment against the uninsured motorist is normally
a condition precedent to the UMC's liability, there are situations where
the law makes it impossible to secure such judgment. One such
situation confronted the supreme court in Wilkinson v. Vigilant
Insurance Co.,"2 where a specific section in the Bankruptcy Code 3"
barred a judgment against the uninsured motorist.'
The supreme
court held that the Uninsured Motorist Act created a mechanism "for the
adjudication of the [UMC's] liability to the insured under the contract of
insurance," in which the UMC "is the real party in interest and not the
uninsured motorist."385 Allowing the UMC to escape liability simply
because the uninsured motorist had gone bankrupt "would be contrary
to the purpose of the Act."3
Accordingly, it held that "the action
should have been allowed to proceed as though it were a John Doe action
[thus authorizing] the insured [to] establish 'all sums which he shall be
legally entitled to recover as damages'. "3s
In Worldwide, the court of appeals concluded that the defense of
sovereign immunity has the same effect as a discharge in bankruptcy. 381 It bars recovery of a judgment as a matter of law, and actions
against the immune defendant should thus be treated as prescribed by
Wilkinson - as John Doe actions formally fixing the extent of the UMC's
liability.38 9 The current state of Georgia law in this context can
therefore be summarized as follows: securing a judgment against the
wrongdoer as a condition of the UMC's liability is still required where
the insured is legally capable of securing such judgment but is prevented
39
from doing so because of his own "inaction or procedural misstep,"'

380.

Id. at 809, 442 S.E.2d at 878. O.C.GA. § 33-7-11(a)(1) (1992) requires the UMC

"to pay the insured all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages."
381. 212 Ga. App. at 811, 442 S.E.2d at 879.
382.
383.

236 Ga. 456, 224 S.E.2d 167 (1976).
11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1994).

384.
385.

Now codified as the "bankruptcy exception" in O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(aX4) (1992).
212 Ga. App. at 810,442 S.E,2d at 878 (quoting Wilkinson v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 236

Ga. 456-57, 224 S.E.2d 167-68 (1976)).

386.
387.
388.
389.

Id.
Id.
Id.,
Id.

390.

Id. (Beasley, J., concurring specially).

(quoting Wilkinson, 236 Ga. at 456, 224 S.E.2d at 167).
(quoting Wilkinson, 235 Ga. at 456, 224 S.E.2d at 167).
442 S.E.2d at 879.
at 811, 442 S.E.2d at 879.
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It is not required where such judg-

F

Use of the UninsuredMotor Vehicle
The facts of Abercrombie v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Co.393 have about them some of the blood-curdling realities of the ten
o'clock news. After a iwo car collision there was an altercation and shots
were exchanged between the vehicles. One of the shots hit a driver and
killed him.3" A wrongful death action against the wrongdoer established that no liability coverage was available because the shot in
question had been intentionally fired and had thus triggered the
exclusion for intentional acts in the wrongdoer's liability policy. As a
result, he was uninsured. 9 Was the victim's UMC liable for UM
benefits under a policy which promised to pick up the wrongdoer's
liabilities for damages if they "result from the ownership, maintenance,
or use of the 'uninsured motor vehicleT" 3' In a six to three opinion,
the court held that it was indeed liable. 7 The tragedy had as its
origin the collision, which arose out of the use of the motor vehicles. The
altercation and gun duel were the direct outgrowth of the collision, and
the fatal gunshot was fired by the wrongdoer using one of the vehicles
as a moving gun platform in the ensuing chase. 9 ' This furnished the
required nexus between the use of the vehicle and the fatality.3

391. Id., 442 S.E.2d at 879-80 (Beasley, J., concurring specially). Examples of such
inaction or procedural missteps would be late service upon the alleged tortfeasor or the
UMC, or a premature and unconditional release of the alleged tortfeasor.
392. Id.

393. 216 Ga. App. 602, 454 S.E.2d 813 (1995).
394. Id. at 602, 454 S.E.2d at 813.
395. Id. at 603, 454 S.E.2d at 814.
396. Id. (quoting the policy) (emphasis added).
397. Id. at 604, 454 S.E.2d at 814.
398. Id. at 603, 454 S.E.2d at 814.
399. Id. at 606, 454 S.E.2d at 816 (Andrews, J., dissenting) (relying largely upon
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Dorris, 161 Ga. App. 46, 288 S.E.2d at 856 (1982)). The
dissenting judges contended that the wrongdoers' deliberate intervening act broke such
chain of causation as might be found to exist. Nationwide there is a cleavage of authority
on this issue. The question is basically whether gun battles and knife fights can be fairly
classified as "motering risks" assumed by the insurer. Compare Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Gillespie, 455 So.2d 617, Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (yes-assault was "inexorably tied" to use of
an automobile) and Foss v. Cignarella, 482 A.2d 954 (1984) (no-assault was not in
reasonable contemplation of parties as a "motoring risk").
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CONCLUSION

Although this observation has surfaced before in these pages it bears
repeating: A clear thread of consistency runs through Georgia jurisprudence in insurance. It is the respect accorded to the enactments of the
General Assembly and the provisions of the insurance contract. Public
policy, when used to strike down exclusions and other parts of the
insurance contract, is usually made of whole cloth, and restricted to
thwarting insurers' attempts to etiolate mandated coverages. It is based
upon legislative intent, painstakingly identified from legislative history,
preambles, and other legitimate sources.
Even when deciding cases of first impression, courts tend to reason
along the vectors of established core principles and to work within the
logical constraints imposed by analogy, juxtaposition, and contrast,
which leaves little play for purely personal preferences. They do not
treat the judicial process as a sentimental exercise in social engineering
or rampant consumerism which views statutes and contracts merely as
circumstances to be considered in reaching a pre-ordained telic
decision.4"' Obviously, this self-restraint leaves some litigants disappointed, °1 yet it is the price we pay for keeping our judicial and
legislative functions separate.

400. See generallyJohn Leo, When Judges Feel Romantic, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPT,
Jan. 23, 1995, at 20.

401. It should be noted that the General Assembly has on several occasions responded
with alacrity to court-exposed deficiencies or inequities in its statutes by legislative "gap
filling." Of course, this is of little consolation to the original litigants.

